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("UCC")i and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
("Restatement")2 with its broad perspective on promissory
estoppel, prescient sages of contract law and theory proclaimed,
first, the irrelevance of contract as a theoretical basis for an
obligation and then its death.4 Friedman and Macaulay prophesied
that standardized business procedures, social relationships, and
shared norms and expectations nullified the necessity for contract
law. Rather than establishing norms for commercial behavior,
they asserted contract was an expensive tool for enforcement and
sanctioning misbehavior.
And why is contract doctrine not central to business
exchanges?
Briefly put, private, between-the-parties
sanctions usually exist, work, and do not involve the costs
of using contract law either in litigation or as a ploy in
negotiations. To begin with, business relationships rarely
generate the kinds of problems considered by academic
contract law. There is a constant pressure to standardize
business and reduce recurring patterns to a routine.
Routine and form create widely shared expectations so that
people can understand who is to do what, quite apart from
the words of a formal contract.5
For Friedman and Macaulay, external control over consensual
agreements through the application of contract law rules and
principles was inconsistent with and derogated from selfregulation based on "community" expectations which, in their
view, more effectively control commercial contract behavior than
the law of contracts.' But, time has established that Friedman and

I Uniform Commercial Code (1997) (Promulgated by the American Law Institute
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, now the
Uniform Law Commission, in 1952.) [hereinafter U.C.C].
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) (Promulgated by the American
Law Institute, the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts is a restating by the
American Law Institute of the perceived better rule of law.).
3 Lawrence M. Friedman & Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract
Teaching: Past,Present, and Future, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 805, 819-20 (1967) [hereinafter
Friedman & Macaulay].
4 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 88 (Ronald K. L. Collins, 2d ed.
1974).
5 Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 3, at 815.
6 See id. at 817,
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Macaulay were wrong. Although parties agree to arbitrate their
disputes, contract law and prevailing usages and custom or
modem Lex Mercatoria rather than social norms and unexpressed
expectations govern the resolution of their disputes.
Seven years after Friedman and Macaulay's edict, Grant
Gilmore, a dean of contract law and theory, decried the doctrine of
Consideration, the then prevailing doctrine for distinguishing
enforceable and unenforceable promises. With the expansion and
development of the theoretical basis for promissory estoppel 8 and
promissory restitution9 in the Restatement, Gilmore asserted that
contract would be absorbed into torts, as he stated: "We are fast
approaching the point where, to prevent unjust enrichment, any
benefit received by a defendant must be paid for unless it was
clearly meant as a gift; where any detriment reasonably incurred
by a plaintiff in reliance on a defendant's assurances must be
Gilmore envisioned the convergence of
recompensed."' 0
substantive law so that no distinction between obligations in
contract and tort existed.'' Gilmore was correct regarding the
dethroning of Consideration as the sole test for determining
enforceability of promises but wrong on his prediction that
contract would be absorbed into torts. On the contrary, recovery
based on promissory estoppel has not proven to be the rold mine
of expanded liability for promises that some expected.' In their
research on promissory estoppel, Professors Schwartz and Scott
determined, from a random sampling of 108 cases, that thirty cases
involved claims based on reliance occurring before an agreement
on the terms. In eighty-seven percent of these thirty cases, courts
denied the claims asserted whether based on promissory estoppel
7 See, e.g., UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts (2010); ICC,
Incoterms 2010 (2010): ICC, Uniform Custom and Practice for Documentary Credits
Revised 2007 (2006). See also Case No. 11/2002; Court: International Arbitration Court
at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; http://www.unilex.
info/case.cfm?id=857 (contract terms required all disputes to be resolved in accordance
with the general principles of the lex nercatoria;the tribunal applied the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Contracts) (November 5, 2002)
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
9 Id. at §§ 82-86.

10GILMORE,
ii Id.
12 Id.

supra note 4, at 88.
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or quasi-contract.' 3
Gilmore also erred in his augury that the demise of
Consideration was also the death of contract. Currently, 83
nationsl 4 are contracting states to the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"),"5 a
convention defining the process for contract creation and
delineating the obligations of the parties. Consideration is not
mentioned and is not required;' 6 agreements between the parties
need not be tested for either Consideration or causa.'" The CISG
as a new promulgation reaffirms the relevance and vitality of
contract but rejects, in part, attempts in the UCC to expand
contract liability, as illustrated by the operation of UCC § 2-207."
In the UCC, an unconditional acceptance stating additional or
different terms always results in contract formation. The issue
then becomes whether the additional or different term becomes a
term of the contract, thus expanding the opportunity for contract
liability. 19 The CISG uses a different theoretical foundation for
13 Schwartz & Scott, PrecontractualLiability and Preliminary Agreements, 120
HARv. L. REv. 661, 671-72 (2007) ("Thirty cases raised the issue of reliance in the
absence of any agreement by the parties regarding terms. These cases thus posed the
question whether the plaintiff could recover reliance costs even though the parties had
not reached any agreement. The courts did not find liability, whether based on
promissory estoppel or quantum meruit3 -in twenty-six, or approximately 87%, of the
thirty preliminary negotiation cases.").
14 For a list of contracting states, nations who are parties to the treaty, visit
www.uncitral.org.
15United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods came into force for contracts involving parties with
businesses in the United States on January 1, 1988.) [hereinafter "CISG"I.
16 Gyula Er6si, Problems of Unifying Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: The Relationship Between Rules On Sales And On
Formation of Contracts of Sale, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 316 (1989) (describing the
failure of both the Working Group and the Conference in raising the necessity of
Consideration for formation of contracts and the exclusion of the need for Consideration
for modification and abrogation of contracts justifying extension by analogy of the
exclusion of Consideration for formation).
17 See generally Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of
Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 621 (1919) (discussing different contract laws in different
jurisdictions regarding causa and consideration).
18 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1997); cf CISG, supra note 15, art. 19.
19 Gilmore viewed Holmes' insistence on Consideration as an attempt to narrow the
possibility of contract liability. See GILMORE, supra note 4, at 88.
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unconditional acceptances that state additional or different terms.
The CISG treats those purported acceptances as a rejection and,
thereby, a counteroffer. Consequently, the potential for contract
liability under the CISG is not as broad as that under the UCC.
The CISG is being embraced by nations as part of the
economic and technological revolution that has birthed global
interdependence among nations. This article addresses from a
comparative perspective the requirements, objectives, and policies
that govern contract formation of transactions in goods subject to
the UCC and to the CISG.
II. Contract Formation - The Process: Common Law
Contrary to Gilmore's prediction, first year law students
attending United States domestic law schools continue to invest
numerous hours studying contract law, seeking to determine
whether a communication is an offer, 2 1 a manifestation of assent
that a reasonable person in the recipient's position would believe
invites his or her assent and, if the assent is given, will conclude a
contract. 22 Communications such as "First Come, First Served"
or "We offer Michigan fine salt in full car load lots of 80 to 95
barrels delivered to your city"24 are assayed. Students use
guidelines such as the presence of language of commitment or
undertaking, 25 the definiteness of the terms, 6 and the number of

20

See CISG, supra note 15, art. 19(1).

§ 24 (1981) (stating the
definition of an offer).
22 Id. §§ 1, 24.
23 Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 251 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d
689 (1957).
24 Moulton v. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 316, 18 N.W. 172 (1884).
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1981); see Bourke v.
Kazaras, 746 A.2d 642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that an advertisement to which
client responded was not an offer but merely an invitation to call bar association's lawyer
referral service for the purpose of entering into negotiations which might subsequently
result in offer and acceptance); see generally Interstate Indus., Inc. v. Barclay Indus.,
Inc., 540 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that where a letter sent by seller to buyer
advised buyer of availability of goods, specifically referred to its contents as a "price
quotation," contained no language which indicated that offer was being made, and failed
to mention the quantity, time of delivery, or payment terms, such letter did not constitute
an "offer").
26 See generally Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 251 Minn.
21 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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parties to whom the communication is addressed 2 7 to resolve the
question of whether the first step in the process of contract
formation, the making of an offer, has been achieved. 28 This
common law approach for determining whether an offer has been
made supplements Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
unless displaced by the provisions of Article 2, including the
underlying purposes and policies of the Article. 29 Although the
UCC abrogates the need for Consideration for some option
contracts 30 and for modification or discharge of contracts that
occur in good faith,3 1 the doctrine is not completely displaced and,
therefore, remains applicable for the enforcement of a contract for
the sale of goods.
Given the continued relevancy of the common law, must
common law rules or similar rigid formalities be applied to cross
border transactions for goods between parties with their places of
business in nations that are signatories to the CISG? What law
governs the determination of the existence of a contract, if the
parties have opted-out of the CISG, or remain subject to its
provisions?
III.

Contract Formation - The Process: UCC & the CISG
Despite the rigid formalism of the common law, 32 the UCC

188, 86 N.W.2d 689 (1957) (holding that where offer in advertisement addressed to the
general public is clear, definite, explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it
constitutes an offer, acceptance of which will complete the contract); see generally
Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 98 Haw. 309, 47 P.3d 1222 (2002) (holding that
advertisements are generally not binding contractual offers, unless they invite acceptance
without further negotiations in clear, definite, express, and unconditional language).
27 Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 539, 369 A.2d 1017, 1032
(1977).
28 See generally Interstate Indus., Inc. v. Barclay Indus., Inc., 540 F.2d 868 (7th
Cir. 1976) (holding that an offer must be sufficiently certain to enable courts to
understand what is asked for and what consideration is sought for the promise).
29 U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (1997). Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been
codified in all but one state, Louisiana. Why States Should Adopt UCC Article 2A,
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=
Why%20States%2OShould%20Adopt%20UCC%2OArticle%202A.
30 See id. § 2-205.
31 See id. § 2-209(l).
32 See Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy:
Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOzO L.
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proclaims in section 2-204 that a contract may be formed in any
manner sufficient to show the existence of a contract, even though
the moment of its making is indeterminable and one or more of its
essential terms are omitted.33 Section 2-204 provides the first
indication that the formalities of the common law are minimized
by the UCC. It is evidence of a strong public policy favoring the
recognition of a contract and the enlargement of contract
liability. 34 If both parties intend to be bound and a reasonably
certain basis for a remedy is present, a contract will not fail for
indefiniteness.
If the agreement is otherwise enforceable, the
Statute of Frauds is satisfied and illegality and other public policy
limitations are inapplicable, this formless agreement will be
enforced. The court will use default terms to supplement the
agreement of the parties.36 However, an assessment of a party's
intention requires the application of the common law principles of
mutual assent.3 7 Therefore, the renounced formalism remains
REV. 1443, 1443-44 (2008).
33 U.C.C. § 2-204 ("Formation in General. (1) A contract for sale of goods may be
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract. (2) An agreement sufficient to
constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is
undetermined. (3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."); see, e.g., Maryland
Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 369 A.2d 1017 (1977) (holding that the
verbal acceptance by subcontractor of general contractor's offer was reasonable in the
circumstances, that subcontractor did so accept it, and that the conduct of the parties,
particularly that of general contractor in delivering concrete and that of subcontractor in
accepting and paying for it, recognized the existence of a contract).
34 Cf GILMORE, supra note 4 (describing Holmes' requirement of Consideration as
reflecting a narrowing of liability for breach of one's promises).
35 U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
36 Natchez Electric and Supply Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 968 So.2d 358 (Miss. 2007)
(holding that employer's acceptance of parts or signing of delivery slips was sufficient
for finding contractual intent); see Continental-Wirt Electronics Corp. v. Sprague Elec.
Co., 329 F. Supp. 959, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (finding that parties knew which piece of
equipment was involved in the transaction, its selling price, and the basics of what the
price included, and no more was necessary for the formation of a contract). See also
U.C.C. § 2-311(1).
37 See generally Winforge, Inc. v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 691 F.3d 856 (7th Cir.
2012) (holding that since mutual assent was lacking, no enforceable contract was
created); Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 369 A.2d 1017 (1977);
Swanson v. Holmquist, 13 Wash. App. 939, 539 P.2d 104 (1975). See also U.C.C. § I-
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applicable.
The common law determination of intent to be bound is an
objective one. The nature of the objective inquiry under domestic
law asks: would a reasonable person in the position of the
recipient of the manifestation of assent - the words, the conduct,
or a failure to act - believe that a commitment is being made.3 8 A
party must intend the action taken and know or have reason to
know that the other may infer an intention to be bound by the
words, conduct, or failure to act. 39 Subject to rules of avoidance 40
for mistake, fraud, duress, or the like, actual mental assent by the
offeror is not a requirement.4 1
Unlike the broad pronouncement of Section 2-204 of the UCC,
the CISG states a fact-intensive principle for the first stage of

103(b) (1997) ("Applicability of Supplemental Principles of Law: Unless displaced by
the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code], the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and
other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.").
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2, cmt. b (1981); see id § 19
("Conduct as Manifestation of Assent: (1) The manifestation of assent may be made
wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act. (2) The
conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to
engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer
from his conduct that he assents. (3) The conduct of a party may manifest assent even
though he does not in fact assent. In such cases a resulting contract may be voidable
because of fraud, duress, mistake, or other invalidating cause."); see also id. § 4 ("How a
Promise May Be Made: A promise may be stated in words either oral or written, or may
be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.") (emphasis added).
39 Id. § 19(2) ("The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his
assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that
the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.").
40 See id. § 19 cmt. b (explaining that while a party must manifest assent, change in
position is not necessary, and change in position is relevant to the existence of a power of
avoidance). The reference to avoidance, the unilateral right to rescind a contract because
of the status of the party seeking to rescind; or the fault or misconduct by the other party
to the agreement in U.S. domestic law is distinguishable from avoidance recognized by
the CISG, the right to cancel a contract because of a fundamental breach by the other
party. See generally CISG arts. 49 & 64.
41 Id. § 19(3) ("The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he does
not in fact assent. In such cases a resulting contract may be voidable because of fraud,
duress, mistake, or other invalidating cause."); see also id. at cmt. b (discussing what
information is needed for a person to have reason to know some fact).
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contract formation.
A proposal is an offer if it is sufficiently
definite, indicates the goods, expressly or implicitly fixes or makes
provision for determining the quantity and the price, and indicates
the intention of the offeror to be bound.
Subject to one
exception, when the parties may have formed a contract without
agreeing on the price, intent plus the material terms of subject
matter, quantity, and price are required before a proposal is
deemed an offer satisfying the foundational step in contract
formation.4 5
These terms may arise from communications
42 CISG, supra note 15, art. 14 ("(1) A proposal for concluding a contract
addressed to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite
and indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A proposal is
sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes
provision for determining the quantity and the price. (2) A proposal other than one
addressed to one or more specific persons is to be considered merely as an invitation to
make offers, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the person making the
proposal.").
43 See Easom Automation Sys., Inc. v. Thyssenkrupp Fabco, Corp., No. 06-14553,
2007 WL 2875256 at *3 (finding that the seller's quote, being sufficiently precise, might
be considered as an offer under the CISG); Cherry Stix Ltd. v. President of the Can.
Borders Servs. Agency, [2005] AP-2004-009 (Can.) (holding that since an offer needs to
be sufficiently definite and to show the offeror's intention to be bound in case of
acceptance, acceptance becomes effective when it reaches the offeror); Geneva Pharm.
Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 98 CIV.961 RWS, 99 CIV.3687 RWS, 2002 WL
1933881 at *3-4 (holding that the proposal was sufficiently definite as the "alleged
contract clearly identifies the goods at issue, clathrate.").
44 See CISG, supra note 15, art. 55 (discussing what happens when parties form a
contract without expressly or implicitly fixing or making a provision to determine the
price).
45 See Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal] Aug. 30,
2000, 9 U 13/00 (Ger.) (holding that the fax could not be considered as an offer because
it did not contain the determinations as to the nature of the goods and provisions for
determining the quantity and the price, neither did the buyer know the plaintiffs intent,
nor could the buyer be aware of what that intent was); Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH]
[Supreme Court] Mar. 20, 1997, docket No. 2 Ob 58/97m (Austria) (holding that a
modification of the offer concerning the quantity of the goods which is exclusively
favorable to the offeror would have to be considered non-material); Oberlandesgericht
Hamburg [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal] Jul. 4, 1997, 1 U 143/95 and 410 0 21/95
(Ger.) (holding that the fax sent by the French company constituted an offer since it was
sufficiently definite as to type of goods, price and quantity, and it indicated the offeror's
intention to be bound); Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court] Paris, Feb. 7 2012, 10-30912
(Fr.) (holding that although the parties had agreed that the basic price of the pears in
Argentina (9 euros) would represent the "base" for the French company to start
marketing the product, this did not mean that a minimum contractual price had been
fixed); Handelsgericht St. Gallen [HG] [Commercial Court] Dec. 5, 1995, HG 45/1994
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between the parties or usages or practices established between
them. 46 If the parties conclude a valid contract without a price, the
CISG provides a gap filler for price.4 7 Thus, the CISG mandates
greater detail and deliberateness in contract formation than the
UCC. The rationale for increased detail is justified. Given the
likelihood of language and cultural differences between the parties
and the adverse impact of different time zones and geographical
distances on the communications between the parties, the
opportunity for confusion and misunderstanding increases,
justifying greater precision for creating an offer. Therefore, a
heightened manifestation of assent is required for befinning the
process of contract formation if the CISG is applicable.
This factual requirement for the offer is not the sole distinction
between the two legal regimes when addressing contract
formation. Of significance is the determination of intention.
Article 8 of the CISG establishes a subjective standard for
intention and meaning rather than an objective standard for
assessing a party's intent to contract and a subject standard for
determining the meaning of terms in the first instance.4 9 Both the

(Switz.) (holding that intention of the offeror to be bound was to be derived from the
terms 'order', 'we order,' and 'immediate delivery' contained in the fax).
46 CISG, supra note 15, art. 9 ("(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which
they have agreed and by any practices which they have established between themselves.
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to
have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed
by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned.").
47 Id. art. 55 ("Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not expressly
or implicitly fix or make provision for determining the price, the parties are considered,
in the absence of any indication to the contrary, to have impliedly made reference to the
price generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract for such goods sold
under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned.").
48 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Article 18, in BIANCA-BONNEL COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 163-74 (Giuffre: Milan 1987) (available at http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/farnsworth-bb I 8.html).
49 CISG, supra note 15, art. 8 ("(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements
made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where
the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was. (2) If the
preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and other conduct of a party
are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable person of the same
kind as the other party would have had in the same circumstances. (3) In determining the
intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due
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CISG and the Restatement assess intent and meaning from
external objective indicators.so However, under the Restatement, if
the objective manifestations would lead a reasonable person in the
position of the recipient/offeree to believe the offeror intends to be
bound, if the question is one of contract formation, the offeror's
subjective intention or understanding of its actions or words,
subjective meaning, is irrelevant.5 ' Similarly, the Restatment
requires objective evidence to determine the mutual intent or
objective meaning of the parties regarding the terms of their
agreement. This objective evidence is used to detect a
misunderstanding 52 and to determine the scope of the contractual
obligations by defining terms based on the objective meaning to
these parties rather than the individual meaning of one of the
parties in the absence of fault or the objective meaning to similarly
situated reasonable parties. CISG relegates the objective meaning
to a second tier of assessment.
A. Subjective Intent - the CISG

To the amazement of most domestic legal professionals,
Article 8 (1) declares as the standard for determining the intent of

consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the
negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves,
usages, and any subsequent conduct of the parties.").
50 See generally CISG art. 8(3); Restatement § 212 & cmt. a, and Restatement § 2,
infra n.50.
si RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 ("(1) A promise is a manifestation of
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee
in understanding that a commitment has been made."); id. at cmt. b ("The phrase
"manifestation of intention" adopts an external or objective standard for interpreting
conduct; it means the external expression of intention as distinguished from undisclosed
intention."); see also id. §§ 19-20 (explaining conduct that manifests assent and the
effect of a misunderstanding).
52 Id. § 20.
53 Id. § 20 cmt. b. ("Manifestation of Intention: As is made clear in Chapter 3,
particularly §§ 17-20, the intention of a party that is relevant to formation of a contract is
the intention manifested by him rather than any different undisclosed intention. The
definitions of 'promise,' 'agreement,' and 'term' in §§ 2, 3 and 5 also refer to
'manifestation of intention.' It follows that the meaning of the words or other conduct of
a party is not necessarily the meaning he expects or understands. He is not bound by a
meaning unless he has reason to know of it, but the expectation and understanding of the
other party must also be taken into account.").
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a contracting party - the party's subjective intent, the subjective
actual intent of the person whose statement or conduct is being
interpreted, rather than the understanding of a reasonable person in
the other's position.54 This emphasis on the actual, subjective,
mental processes of the speaker or actor is, however, substantially
limited by the reasonable understanding of the other party who is
the recipient of the manifestation." The speaker/actor's subjective
intent only governs the interpretation of his/her statements or
conduct if the other party knew or could not have been unaware of
the speaker/actor's actual intent. 56 Observe that the CISG
allocates any risk of error between the speaker's actual intent and
what the hearer/recipient could not have been unaware to the
hearer/recipient." If the hearer/recipient could understand or could
have been aware of the speaker/actor's intention, the actual
subjective intent the speaker/actor is the relevant intention.5 ' The
allocation of the risk in Article 8 of the CISG to the
hearer/recipient is consistent with the general approach to error
found in the CISG. 8 Consider the following hypothetical
situation: a seller actually intends to sell Black Beauty, one of two
horses that seller has advertised for sale. In negotiations with the
buyer, statements made regarding the pedigree of the horse and
awards are understood by both as references to Black Beauty.
Later, in the written offer to sell, seller refers to his second horse,
Midnight Warrior. The buyer signs the writing and her assent

54CISG, supra note 15, at art. 8.
55 Id.
56 Id.

57 Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. Ltd. v. ACI International, Inc., Case
No. 03-4165-JAR (Kan.) (2007), available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases
/070928u2.html (court considers objective evidence and determines that the seller could
not have understood the buyer's alleged subjective intent to serve as an intermediary
rather than a contracting party to fourteen transactions between them);
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 27, 2007, X ZR 111/04 (Ger.),
available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127gl.htmi (the buyer's statements to
the seller's employee and the terms of the contract amendment established that the seller
could not have been unaware of the buyer's intent).
ss See, e.g.,CISG art. 27 ("Unless otherwise expressly provided in this Part of the
Convention, if any notice, request or other communication is given or made by a party in
accordance with this Part and by means appropriate in the circumstances, a delay or error
in the transmission of the communication or its failure to arrive does not deprive that
party of the right to rely on the communication.").
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creates a contract for Black Beauty because the buyer "could not
have been unaware" of the seller's actual intent.59 Article 8 directs
the court or tribunal to consider "all relevant circumstances of the
case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties
have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties." 60 The parties have a contract for the
purchase of Black Beauty.
Pursuant to the Restatement, the parties have a contract but it is
subject to the seller's right of avoidance for unilateral mistake. If
we assume that the buyer assented to the terms of the offer aware
of the seller's mistake, a contract for Mighty Warrior results, 6' but
the seller's attempt to avoid the contract for unilateral mistake62
should be successful because the buyer had reason to know of the
seller's scrivener error.6 3
Article 4 of the CISG mandates that issues of validity are
subject to the applicable domestic law as determined by the forum
court's private international law rules and are not within the scope
of the CISG.64 The foregoing "Black Beauty" hypothetical
situation does not fall within Article 4, but within Article 8(1).61
Id. art. 8 (3).
Id.
61 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20(b) & cmt. d, illus. 5.
62 Id. § 153(b).
63 Id. § 19 cmt. b ("A person has reason to know a fact, present or future, if he has
information from which a person of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in
question does or will exist. A person of superior intelligence has reason to know a fact if
he has information from which a person of his intelligence would draw the inference.
There is also reason to know if the inference would be that there is such a substantial
chance of the existence of the fact that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the
matter in question, the person would predicate his action upon the assumption of its
possible existence.").
64 CISG, supra note 15, art. 4 ("This Convention governs only the formation of the
contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from
such a contract. In particular, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention,
it is not concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of
any usage."). But see Oberster Gerichtshof, docket no. 2 Ob 100/00 w, Austria, April 13,
2000 (court determines that CISG is applicable to resolve an issue of "mistake" despite
article 4).
59
60

65 See generally PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW - THE UNCONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODs 39 (1986)
(discussing the interpretation of statements and conduct). Accord Oberster Gerichtshof,

supra, n. 64.
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The court or tribunal seeking to interpret the manifestations,
words, or conduct of the speaker/actor to determine the seller's
actual intent and that which the hearer, the buyer, was reasonably
aware of, should seize upon the statements made by the seller that
clearly indicate that the sale of Black Beauty, not Mighty Warrior,
was actually intended by the seller and understood by the buyer. 66
All relevant circumstances are used for determining whether the
hearer/recipient "could not have been unaware" of the
speaker/actor's actual intent.
The determination of the
hearer/recipient's understanding is an objective one.67 Here, as
with the determination of the seller's actual intent, all classes of
evidence are admissible for determining the hearer/recipient's
understanding of the speaker's actual intent; the listing of the
classes of evidence in Article 8(3) is illustrative, not exhaustive. 68

66 See CISG, supra note 15, art. 8(3) ("In determining the intent of a party or the
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given to
all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the
parties.").
67 See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 27, 2007, Case No.
X ZR 111/04 (Ger.) (Seller knew, or could not have been unaware that buyer's real
purpose of its proposed contract amendment was to conceal the real purchase price from
its customers in Russia. Buyer's employees openly revealed this purpose at the time of
the proposal and wording of the amendment indicated the buyer's intention to recover
the purchase price increase received by the seller in full. These circumstances, together
with life experience, resulted in a reasonable conclusion that the seller was in the
position to understand that the consulting fees in the contract amendment had been
erroneously calculated); see also U.N. Conference on CISG, 6th mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97 (Mar. 14, 1980) (Mr. Michida's comment during the debate regarding the
United Kingdom's proposal to eliminate the "could not have been unaware" standard in
Article 8 (1), stating "observing that representatives were divided over the United
Kingdom proposal," reminded the meeting of the famous Peerless case. That had been
the name of two different vessels and the purchaser of the cargo of the Peerless had
relied on possible confusion between the two. With the existing text of article 7 [became
CISG article 8], any confusion would have been impossible, as the purchaser "could not
have been unaware" of the existence of two vessels of the same name. If the United
Kingdom proposal was accepted, there would no longer be an objective criterion for
settling such cases. For that reason his delegation could not support that proposal.")
(emphasis added).
68 MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d'Agostino, S.p.A., 144
F.3d. 1384, 1388 (1 lth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1087 (1999); Filanto S.p.A. v.
Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F.Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme
Court] Dec. I1, 1996, VIII ZR 154/95 (Ger.).
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Article 8 also governs the interpretation of statements and
conduct by the parties for modification or termination of their
agreement,6 9 declaration of avoidance, revocation of the contract, 70
and statements or conduct of offer and acceptance.7 Indeed, any
statement or conduct that is relevant to the performance of an
obligation or the assertion of any right under the CISG, such as
notices or other required communications regarding cure or
delayed performance or missing specifications, are subject to the
standards of Article 8.72 Article 48(3) appears to be an exception
by expressing the meaning for any notice of performance given by
the seller to the buyer after the date for performance or cure has
passed. Here, any statement of performance is to be treated as a
request by the seller for notice of buyer's intent to accept the offer
of cure.

69 CISG, supra note 15, art. 29 ("(1) A contract may be modified or terminated by
the mere agreement of the parties. (2) A contract in writing which contains a provision
requiring any modification or termination by agreement to be in writing may not be
otherwise modified or terminated by agreement. However, a party may be precluded by
his conduct from asserting such a provision to the extent that the other party has relied on
that conduct.").
70 Id. art. 26 ("A declaration of avoidance of the contract is effective only if made
by notice to the other party.").

71 Id. art. 8.

72 U.N. Secretariat, Commentary on Article 7 of the 1978 Draft, cmt. I ("Article 7
[draft counterpart of the Convention Article 8] on interpretationfurnishes the rules to be
followed in interpreting the meaning of any statement or other conduct of a party which
falls within the scope of application of this Convention. Interpretation of the statements
or conduct of a party may be necessary to determine whether a contract has been
concluded, the meaning of the contract, or the significance of a notice given or other act
of a party in the performance of the contract or in respect of its termination.") (emphasis
added).
73 CISG, supra note 15, art. 48(3) ("A notice by the seller that he will perform
within a specified period of time is assumed to include a request, under the preceding
paragraph, that the buyer make known his decision.").
74 Id.; see also Official Commentary to 1978 Draft, Paragraph 13: "If the seller
intends to cure the nonconformity, he will normally so notify the buyer. He will also
often inquire whether the buyer intends to exercise his remedies of avoiding the contract
or declaring the price to be reduced or whether he wishes, or will accept, cure by the
seller." See generally [Amtsgericht Nordhom] June 14, 1994, 3 C 75/94 (Ger.),
translated text available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940614gl.htmi (holding that
buyer accepted goods and failed to refuse an additional period of time for performance
by the seller of its obligations).
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B. When the Intentions of the PartiesDo Not Conform
Some commentators suggest that Article 8 does not govern a
misunderstanding when either the hearer could not have been
aware of the speaker's actual intent, the standard of Article 8(1), or
when a reasonable person's understanding of the speaker's intent,
the standard of Article 8(2), would not conform to the intent of the
hearer when he or she responds.7 5 This is similar to the notorious
Peerless case.76 The buyer and seller agreed that buyer would
purchase and the seller would deliver cotton "ex Peerless from
Bombay." The seller sued the buyer after the buyer refused to
accept the delivery of the cotton in December. The buyer
defended that the agreement was for cotton delivered "ex Peerless"
that arrived in October and the seller was not ready, willing, and
able to perform. The facts suggest that from the circumstancesthe buyer could not have been aware of the seller's actual intent of
delivering the goods from "Peerless #2" sailing in December, and
that a reasonable person would not have understood that the seller
intended "Peerless #2." Furthermore, the seller could not have
been aware that the buyer intended "Peerless #1" that sailed in
October, and a reasonable person would not have understood the
buyer intended "Peerless #1." Here, their relative intentions do not
conform. Pursuant to the Restatement, no contract results. The
question is whether the CISG or domestic law governs the
determination of whether a contract exists when the CISG is the
applicable law. Article 7(2) provides:
Questions concerning matters governed by this the CISG

75 SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 65, ("The Convention does not regulate the
consequences of a discrepancy between the actual but unrecognizable intent of a party on
the one hand, and, on the other, either the objective meaning of that party's statement in
the sense of Article 8(2) or the other party's response to the first statement where the
intent of the parties does not coincide. The regulation of such discrepancies is a question
for domestic law. It appears, however, that Article 8(1) and (2) prevents a party's purely
subjective intent from being decisive (secret reservations!) and prescribes the solution
found in § 117 of the German Civil Code for a sham statement. [I l6a] As far as these
deficiencies in intent are concerned, domestic law is replaced by the Convention.").
76 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex.); 2 Hurl. & c. 906.
77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(1)(a) (saying "there is no
manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially different
meanings to their manifestations and neither party knows or has reason to know the
meaning attached by the other.").
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which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based
or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international
law.
The CISG governs contract formation and the determination of
intent. However, the CISG does not expressly settle the resolution
of the issue of the failure of the parties' intentions to conform.
Therefore, a better approach than resorting to domestic law in the
first instance is the application of general principles on which the
CISG is based, and if there are not any, to then resort to the law
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. Such
an approach would implement the foundational goals of the CISG,
by giving regard to the CISG's "international character and to the
need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance
of good faith in international trade."
C. Secret Reservation ofIntent
Commentators have raised for deliberation the impact of
Article 8(1) on a party's subjective intent not to be bound when
that intention is contrary to the reasonable meaning of the words
and conduct of the party. 79 The infamous case of Lucy v. Zehmero
immediately comes to mind for domestic parties and their
counselors. The buyer and seller were drinking at the seller's
establishment. The seller's wife was there, working at the time.
Winking at his wife, the seller accepted the buyer's offered to
purchase their farm. The buyer agreed to purchase the farm, The
seller and his wife signed a crudely drafted agreement and the
buyer offered a binder or deposit which the seller declined. When
sued for breach, the seller asserted he and his wife were only
joking and therefore no contract was created between the parties.
His actual subjective intent, the seller asserted, did not result in
legal consequences. Ruling for the buyer, the court held that the
reasonable understanding of the seller's actions and words, not his

CISG, supra note 15, art. 7(1).
Martin Schmidt-Kessel, Article 8, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 145, 149
7 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed.,
2010).
80 Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493 (1954).
78
79
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subjective intent, governed the effect of his words and conduct.
Would the outcome have been different had Lucy v. Zehmer been a
transaction for goods subject to the CISG? The short answer is: it
depends! Was the buyer aware or could the buyer have not been
unaware of the seller's actual intent? If the buyer knew or could
not have been unaware of the seller's actual intent, no contract
results. The buyer's knowledge or understanding of the seller's
actual intent based on all the circumstances circumscribes the
effect of the seller's actual intent.8 ' Was the transaction that
occurred at the tavern the first one between the parties or was this
part of regularly occurring banter between two neighbors both
knowing that neither was serious? What conduct did the seller
engage in after the purported contract was formed? Although
irrelevant when the objective theory of contract is the applicable
approach for determining intent at contract formation, the seller's
subsequent action is relevant in determining the seller's actual
subjective intent when Article 8 is the applicable legal rule. 82
D. "Could Not Have Been Unaware" v. "Reason to Know"
Although domestic lawyers and judges may be confounded by
the dominance of the subjective standard mandated by the CISG
for determining intent, in the first instance, domestic lawyers and
judges are very familiar with a varying standard of "knowledge"
not only applicable to transactions in goods,8 3 but also, according
81 U.N. Secretariat, supra note 72, cmt. 4 ("Article 7 [draft counterpart of the
Convention Article 8] cannot be applied if the party who made the statement or engaged
in the conduct had no intention on the point in question or if the other party did not know
and had no reason to know what that intent was. In such a case, article 7(2) [draft
counterpart of the Convention Article 8(2)] provides that the statements made by and
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding that a reasonable
person [of the same kind as the other party] would have had in the same
circumstances.").
82 See, e.g., Franklins PTY LTD v Metcash Trading LTD [2009] NSW (Austl.),
available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1520 (distinguishing the effect of
subsequent conduct when the objective versus the subjective approach of the CISG and
UNIDROIT is applicable to the transaction); see also CISG, supra note 15, art. 8.
83U.C.C. § 1-202 (1977): ("Notice; Knowledge. (a) Subject to subsection (f), a
person has "notice" of a fact if the person: (1) has actual knowledge of it; (2) has
received a notice or notification of it; or (3) from all the facts and circumstances known
to the person at the time in question, has reason to know that it exists. (b) "Knowledge"
means actual knowledge. "Knows" has a corresponding meaning. (c) "Discover,"
"learn," or words of similar import refer to knowledge rather than to reason to know.").
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to the Restatement,84 for licenses, services, and real estate
contracts. Both legal systems authorize imputing "knowledge" of
a fact if, under the CISG and the UCC, the recipient of the
conduct or words, or under the Restatement, a person of ordinary
intelligence in the position of the hearer/observer, could infer from
the facts and circumstance the existence of a fact 86 even though the
recipient or person does not have actual knowledge "and/or"
conscious belief in the fact's existence.
E. Subjective Intent and ContractInterpretation
Although not expressly stated in the CISG, it is presumed that
Article 8 governs the interpretation of contract provisions and
terms as well.8 7 Consider the following hypothetical situation:
A Norwegian buyer visits a trade show in New York.
While there she discusses with a U.S. seller her needs for
insulation for rubber fishing boots that she manufactures.
They discuss the materials used in manufacturing the boots
and the different grades of insulation manufactured by the
seller. The seller makes a specific recommendation of one
its products. The parties exchange business cards with
contact information that included geographical location,
telephone and fax numbers, and email addresses.
Thereafter, the buyer ordered via fax on her business
letterhead and the seller delivered to Norway the
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981) ('"Reason to know.'
A person has reason to know a fact, present or future, if he has information from which a
person of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in question does or will exist. A
person of superior intelligence has reason to know a fact if he has information from
which a person of his intelligence would draw the inference. There is also reason to
know if the inference would be that there is such a substantial chance of the existence of
the fact that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, the
person would predicate his action upon the assumption of its possible existence. Reason
to know is to be distinguished from knowledge and from "should know." Knowledge
means conscious belief in the truth of a fact; reason to know need not be conscious.
"Should know" imports a duty to others to ascertain facts; the words "reason to know"
are used both where the actor has a duty to another and where he would not be acting
adequately in the protection of his own interests were he not acting with reference to the
facts which he has reason to know.").
85 See CISG, supra note 15; see U.C.C. § 1-202 (a)(3).
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cnt. b.
87 MMC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d'Agostino, S.P.A., 144
F.3d. 1384 (1Ith Cir. 1998).
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previously recommended insulation. The buyer used the
insulation for her manufacturing process in Norway and
distributed her output to the Scandinavian fishing industry.
The insulation proved insufficient, resulting in cracks and
ruptures in the boots, physical injury to the wearer, and
liability for the buyer to her end users. The seller argues
that it isn't liable for breach of an express or implied
obligation of fitness.8 8
Of concern is whether the seller was aware that the insulation
was to be used in Norway and needed to be "fit" for winter
weather there. Prevailing case authority holds 89 that a seller is
only obligated to provide goods that are fit for the buyer's
purposes at the place of their intended use if: (1) the standards are
the same at the place of the buyer's intended use and seller's
location; (2) the buyer has informed the seller of the regulations at
the location of its intended use or (3) if special circumstances,
such as the existence of a seller's branch office in the buyer's
state, the seller knew or should have known about the
regulations.90 Applying Article 8(1)'s subjective standard to the
facts of the hypothetical setting, the Norwegian buyer's statement
regarding the location of her business, the address on her business
card, information shared when discussing her use of the insulation
for the Norwegian fishing industry or in placing the order or
communicating with the seller, and the requested destination for
the delivery of the goods, all support a conclusion that the seller
could not have been unaware of the buyer's intended use in
Norway. If, however, the buyer shipped her wares to Russia for
sale, the seller would not have been aware of the buyer's intended
use in Russia. The question is whether under the circumstances,
including practices or course of dealings, the seller was aware. 9 1 if
88 This problem is a modification of the "Insulation Sold to Germany" problem
appearing in and reprinted with permission of West Academic from FOLSOM, GORDON, &

SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK

75-76 (9th ed. 2009).
89 See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] Apr. 13, 2000, docket No. 2 Ob 100/00
(Austria), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=687; Medical Mktg. Int'l, Inc.
v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7380, at *5 (E.D.
La. 1999).
90See Medical Mktg., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6.
91See supra note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "could not have
been unaware" standard.
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The seller could not have been unaware of the buyer's intended
use in Norway, was the seller obligated to supply insulation that
was fit for use in Norway as Article 8(1) mandates?9 2
German courts, the first to address the question of the
applicable locale for determining if the seller met its obligation
under Article 35(2)(a), chose to interpret the duty imposed on the
seller of providing goods that conform to the ordinary purpose of
such goods without reference to Article 8.9 Rather, the seller's
92 See Clout case # 202, French Court of Appeals (Grenoble) (1996) (based on
course of dealings, Italian seller knew goods were destined for the French market and
seller was obliged under art. 8(1) to comply with French marketing regulations). See
also Text of Secretariat Commentary on article 33 of the 1978 Draft [draft counterpart of
CISG article 35] [Conformity of the goods] for the varying positions on the applicable
locale for determining if the seller fulfilled its obligation at http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-35.html.
93 Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Apr. 20, 1994, docket no. 13 U 51/93 (Ger.) (goods
can be conforming even if the seller does not comply with the public law provisions
concerning the merchantability of the goods in force in each of the countries where the
goods might be exported), aff'd, Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) Mar. 8, 1995, docket no.
VIII ZR 159/94 (Ger.) (seller could only be expected to conform goods to buyer's
country's standards: (1) where the same rules also exist in the seller's country; (2) where
the buyer draws the seller's attention to their existence; (3) or, possibly, where the seller
knows or should know of those rules due to "special circumstances," such as (i) when the
seller has a branch in the buyer's country, (ii) when the parties are in a longstanding
business relationship, (iii) when the seller regularly exports in the buyer's country, or (iv)
when the seller advertises its own products in the buyer's country); Landgericht
Ellwangen (LG) Aug. 21, 1995, docket no. I KfI 0 32/95 (Ger.) (in light of their
previous commercial relationships, the parties had impliedly agreed that the goods
should comply with the standards provided by the buyer's law on food);
Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Jan. 29, 2004, docket no. 8 0 57/01 (Ger.) (rejecting the
buyer's argument that it was not liable if goods failed to meet the public law
requirements of its country, the goods lack of certification that they were not
contaminated would prevent the sale in the seller's country by virtue of EU rules) , aff'd,
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) Mar. 2, 2005, docket no. VIII ZR 67/04 (Ger.); accord
Oberster Gerichtshof (OGH) Apr. 13, 2000, docket No. 2 Ob 100/00 (Austria)
(remanding, the Supreme held, the seller cannot generally be expected to observe special
public law requirements in the buyer's country, not even when the seller knows in which
country the goods will be exported); Audiencia Provincial de Granada (A.P.) Mar. 2000,
docket no. 143/2000 (Spain) (US buyer sued Spanish seller after frozen chicken
delivered to the Ukraine for distribution failed to meet Ukrainian law; held: the mere
circumstance that the goods failed to meet the specific law requirements of the country in
which they would be marketed did not automatically mean that they should be deemed
unfit for ordinary use if they complied with the law requirements of their country of
origin, if the buyer had not specifically mentioned this necessity to the seller and,
especially, if the buyer, as here, had examined and approved a sample of the same goods
beforehand; Medical Mktg., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6.
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duty under Article 35(2)(a) is interpreted as one of complying
with the standards of its own place of business9 4 in the absence of
an agreement to provide goods that conform to the buyer's place
of business," or the presence of the same standards in both the
buyer's and the seller's locale, or special circumstances. The risk
of purchasing goods that do not conform to the place of the
buyer's intended distribution or use is allocated to the buyer; the
obligation of determining the applicable standard of performance
for the goods in the place of distributing or marketing of the goods
is allocated to the buyer; as well as the ascertaining of the relative
consistency between the standards of seller's place of business and
those of the place of the intended use is allocated to the buyer.
This allocation is a reasonable addition to the due diligence that a
buyer undertakes in selecting its supplier.
IV. Offers: Duration and Revocability of Offers
Domestic common law of contracts provides that offers are
effective upon receipt96 and any durational period commences
upon receipt. 97
Offers are generally revocable. 98 Absent
consideration or another validating device, a promise not to revoke
the offer being made or an offer stating a duration period is a
nudum pactum, a naked promise, and is merely an offer to make an
unenforceable gift.99 If the offer states a duration period for
acceptance or a statement that it will not be revoked, the offer is
revocable until accepted. The UCC modifies this result for the
signed written offers or recordsoo bearing an electronic

94 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) Mar. 8, 1995, docket no. VIII ZR 159/94 (Germ.)
(stating that the standards of the seller's country specify the suitability of an ordinary
usage).
95 Audiencia Provincial de Pontevedra (A.P.) Oct. 3, 2002, docket no. AC
2002\1851 (Spain) (an explicit term of the contract placed the responsibility on the seller
if the goods were unfit for importation into Jordan according to Jordanian health
authorities' standards).
96 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63 (1981).
97 Id.
98 Id. § 42 cmt. a.

99 Id.

1oo THE UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT §2 (13) 7A U.L.A. 225 (2002) [hereinafter
UETA] ("'Record' means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.").
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signature'ol of a merchant that uses language such as
"guaranteed," "irrevocable," or "firm" that assures the offeree that
the offer will not be revoked.102 Without consideration, these
offers are irrevocable for the period stated or a reasonable time if
the offer lacks a durational term but not longer than ninety (90)
days despite the stated term unless the offeree provides
consideration. 0 3 Absent language that provides evidence of an
intent to make the offer "firm," language such as "open" or "good"
should be treated as language of duration and the general rule of
Given the abrogation of the need for
revocability should apply.'
consideration or estoppel to prevent revocation of an offer,
language that satisfies Section 2-205 must be expressive of a
commitment not to revoke, some unambiguous heightened
manifestation that is distinguishable from language of duration. 0 5
The example used by the commentary to Section 2-205 to illustrate
the application of the effect of the section when the period of
irrevocability is linked to the happening of a contingency supports
this position. "If the offer states that it is 'guaranteed' or 'firm'
until the happening of a contingency which will occur within the
three month period, it will remain irrevocable until that event." 0 6
Here, language indicating a heightened manifestation is present.
An offer with terms such as "good" or "open," even if in a signed
record by a merchant, remains revocable.
Offers subject to the CISG are effective upon receipt.'o0
Consistent with the law governing domestic offers, offers are
lo Id. § 2(8) ("'Electronic signature" means an electronic sound, symbol, or process
attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person
with the intent to sign the record.").
102 U.C.C. § 2-205 (1977).
103Id. ("Firm Offers: An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in
no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months."). See also Id. crnt. 3
104Id. cmt. 3 ("If the offer states that it is "guaranteed" or "firm" until the happening
of a contingency which will occur within the three month period, it will remain
irrevocable until that event.").
105 Id.
106 Id.

107 CISG, supra note 15, art. 15 ("(1) An offer becomes effective when it reaches the
offeree. (2) An offer, even if it is irrevocable, may be withdrawn if the withdrawal
reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the offer.").
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generally revocable and may be revoked if the revocation reaches
the offeree before a contract is created either by an oral acceptance
of the offer, 08 or performance constituting acceptance,' 09 or if the
revocation reaches the offeree before the acceptance is
dispatched."i 0 Dispatch of an acceptance creates an irrevocable
offer and not a contract. This modified "mailbox rule" is a
compromise position between the general policy view of the
revocability offers at Common Law and the general policy view of
the irrevocability of offers recognized by Civil Law." However,
the similarity between the treatment of offer in U.S. domestic law
and the treatment of offers pursuant to the CISG ends here.
If an offer states that it is "open" for a stated period of time or
a durational period is included in the offer, or the offer includes a
commitment not to revoke, or a statement that a reasonable person
would understand as meaning the offer is irrevocable,"12 or if it is
reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as irrevocable
followed by actual reliance,' 13 an irrevocable offer is created for
the duration stated. If the offer does not state the period of time
for which it is open or irrevocable, the offer is irrevocable for a
reasonable time. 14 The CISG is only applicable to transactions
between commercial parties." 5 Therefore, the effect of Article
16(2) is analogous to that of the UCC, but without the formalities
imposed by the UCC, protecting potential reliance by a
108 Id. art. 16(1) ("Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the
revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance.").

109 See id. art. 18(3).

no Id. art. 16(1) ("Until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked if the
revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance."). See text and
notes, infra, at note 128 for a discussion of acceptance by promise.
Ill Secretariat Commentary on Article 14 of the 1978 Draft of the CISG cmt. 5,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/text/secomm/secomm- I6.html#1.
112 CISG, supra note 15, art. 8(2)-(3).
113 Id. art. 16(2)(b) ("If it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being
irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.").
14 Id. art. 8(2).
its Id. art. 2(a) ("This Convention does not apply to sales: (a) of goods bought for
personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the
conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were
bought for any such use."); Id. at art. 1(a) ("This Convention applies to contracts of sale
of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States.") (emphasis
added).
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commercial party who might be induced to delay its acceptance, or
to undertake extensive investigations of the offer or the offeror, or
engage in negotiations with others for related inputs for its
processes or otherwise change position because of the presence of
such language. Article 16(2) "reflects the judgment [sic] that in
commercial relations, and particularly in international commercial
relations, the offeree should be able to rely on any statement by the
offeror which indicates that the offer will be open for a period of
time."'16
Because offers are only effective when they "reach" the
offeree, an offer may be withdrawn even if, by its terms, it is
irrevocable. However, the withdrawal must reach the offeree
before or at the same time as the offer.'" 7 The arrival of two
conflicting manifestations results in the absence of an intention to
be bound. 8 An offer subject to the CISG "reaches" the offeree
when it is made to the offeree orally or delivered by "any other
For
means" to him personally or to his place of business.
electronic communications, the determination of the "time" when
the communication is delivered to the offeree should be made
using the relevant law governing electronic communications. This
law might be the United Nations Convention on the Use of
Electronic Communications in International Contracts' 20 or the
116Secretariat Commentary, supra note 111, cmt. 6.
117 CISG, supra note 15, art. 15(2) ("An offer, even if it is irrevocable, may be
withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the offer.").
118 See id. art. 14(1).
I19 Id. art. 24 ("For the purposes of this Part of the Convention, an offer, declaration
of acceptance or any other indication of intention "reaches" the addressee when it is
made orally to him or delivered by any other means to him personally, to his place of
business or mailing address or, if he does not have a place of business or mailing address,
See also CISG-AC Opinion no 1, Electronic
to his habitual residence.").
Communications under CISG, 15 August 2003 (Rapporteur: Professor Christina
Ramberg, Gothenburg, Sweden)(recognizing that the absence of a form requirement
under CISG supports electronic communications and identifying the complexities of
determining "reached" when electronic communications are used); available at:
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/CISG-AC-opl.html.
120 U.N. Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International
Contracts art. 10(2), UN Doc. A/RES/60/515 (Nov. 23, 2005) (defining the time of
receipt as "the time when it becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee at an
[hereinafter Electronic
electronic address designated by the addressee").
Communications Convention]. The time of receipt of an electronic communication at
another electronic address of the addressee is the time when it becomes capable of being

270

N.C. J. INT'L L. &COM. REG.

Vol. XL

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,121 or domestic legislation
enacted by a nation based on the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce.122 Evolving from the 1996 Model Law to
the refined 2005 Convention, prevailing law governing electronic
communication defines "receipt" as the time the transmission is
retrievable by the offeree.12 3 Each of these regimes permits the
parties to derogate or vary the definition by an agreement. Each
regime imposes limits on information received at an information
processing system other than that designated or used by the
recipient: U.S. domestic law only recognizes a communication as
received if the information is sent to the information processing
system designated or used by the recipient;124 the Model Act
deems information sent to an undesignated system as received
when the data message is actually retrieved by the addressee;I 25
and the most modern regime, the Electronic Communications
Convention, uses the time when the transmission is capable of
being retrieved by the addressee at that address and the addressee
is aware that the electronic communication has been sent to an

retrieved by the addressee at that address and the addressee becomes aware that the
electronic communication has been sent to that address. An electronic communication is
presumed to be capable of being retrieved by the addressee when it reaches the
addressee's electronic address. Id.
121 UETA § 15(b) ("Unless otherwise agreed between a sender and the recipient, an
electronic record is received when: (1) it enters an information processing system that the
recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or
information of the type sent and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic
record; and (2) it is in a form capable of being processed by that system.").
122 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce art. 15(2), June 12, 1996, 36
I.L.M. 197. Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, the time
of receipt of a data message is determined as follows: (a) if the addressee has designated
an information system for the purpose of receiving data messages, receipt occurs: (i) at
the time when the data message enters the designated information system; or (ii) if the
data message is sent to an information system of the addressee that is not the designated
information system, at the time when the data message is retrieved by the addressee; (b)
if the addressee has not designated an information system, receipt occurs when the data
message enters an information system of the addressee. Id.
123 See UETA § 15(b), supra note 121; see UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, supra note 122.
124 See UETA § 15(b).
125 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, supra note 122, art.

15(2).
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address other than that designated.126
Although offers subject to the CISG are effective when they
"reach" the offeree, the time at which the durational period
commences varies based on the medium used to communicate the
offer.127 Unlike U.S. domestic law, which commences the running
of the duration of offers upon receipt,128 the CISG makes a
distinction based on the use of third party transmitters and a
transmission of the offer by the offeror.12 For transmissions
involving third parties such as telegrams, the duration commences
when the information is "handed over" for transmission; for a
mailing or the analogous use of express delivery service, the
duration commences on the date of the letter or on the date on the
envelope if the letter is undated.130 The likelihood that the offeree
might discard the envelope and the potential failure of the offeror
to record the date of mailing were the bases for selecting the date
of the letter rather than the postmark or the mailing date, as both
parties are likely to have retained the letter or its copy. 1' If the
offer is communicated by means of instantaneous electronic
communication such as telephone, telex, email, or text message,
126 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION

ON THE

USE

OF

ELECTRONIC

COMMUNICATIONS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

art. 10(2), U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.2 (2005).
127 CISG, supra note 15, art. 20(1), U.N. Sales No. E.O.V.14 (2010) ("A period of
time for acceptance fixed by the offeror in a telegram or a letter begins to run from the
moment the telegram is handed in for dispatch or from the date shown on the letter or, if
no such date is shown, from the date shown on the envelope. A period of time for
acceptance fixed by the offeror by telephone, telex or other means of instantaneous
communication, begins to run from the moment that the offer reaches the offeree.").
128 See generally Caldwell v. Cline, 109 W. Va. 553 (1930) (holding that an offer to
exchange lands is not completed until the offeree has received the offer).
129CISG, supra note 15, art. 20(1) ("A period of time for acceptance fixed by the
offeror in a telegram or a letter begins to run from the moment the telegram is handed in
for dispatch or from the date shown on the letter or, if no such date is shown, from the
date shown on the envelope. A period of time for acceptance fixed by the offeror by
telephone, telex or other means of instantaneous communication, begins to run from the
moment that the offer reaches the offeree."). Cf UNIDROIT Principles of International
Contracts art. 2.1.8 that uses the date of dispatch, the putting of the communication
whether email or letter beyond the control of the offeror, as the relevant date for the fixed
duration of an offer to commence.
CONTRACTS,

130 CISG, supra note 15, art. 20(1).

131Text of Secretariat Commentary on Article 18 of the 1978 Draft (Draft
Counterpart of CISG Article 20) (1978).
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the duration commences "the moment the offer reaches the
offeree."l 32 Intervening official holidays and non-business days
are included in calculating the expiration date.'3 3 However, if the
last day of the period falls on an official holiday or non-business
day at the place of acceptance, the period is extended to the next
business day.134 Care must be taken by the offeree to avoid
assuming that official holidays and non-business days at its locale
are identical to those at the offeror's location or that the offeree's
holidays and non-business days are relevant in calculating the
expiration of the offer. The offeror's location is the "place of
acceptance" unless otherwise designated in the offer.' 35
In assessing the varying approaches between U.S. domestic
law and that of the CISG on irrevocable offers, the formalities
imposed by domestic law are cumbersome, imposing a significant
proof burden on the party asserting that the offer was irrevocable.
These formalities may be justified by the abrogation of the
historically required validating device of consideration that
satisfied cautionary and channeling functions of form,' 36 a
cautionary function of guarding "the promisor against illconsidered action," and a "channeling or signalizing function, to
distinguish" 137 an enforceable transaction "from other types and
from tentative or exploratory expressions of intention."' 3 8
As an autonomous harmonized legal regime without the
historical precedent that supplements the UCC, the CISG operates
with greater flexibility in recognizing the needs of commercial
parties and the realities of trading across international borders.

CISG, supra note 15, at 20(1).
Id. art. 20(2) ("Official holidays or non-business days occurring during the
period for acceptance are included in calculating the period. However, if a notice of
acceptance cannot be delivered at the address of the offeror on the last day of the period
because that day falls on an official holiday or a non-business day at the place of
business of the offeror, the period is extended until the first business day which
follows.").
'34 Id.
135 See generally SCHLECHTRIEM,
supra note 65 ("Parties in international trade
cannot be expected to adjust to various national, regional or local holidays.").
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 cmt. a ("[T]he fact of bargain also
tends to satisfy the cautionary and channeling functions of form.").
137 Id. § 72, cmt. c.
132

133

138

Id.
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However, the common law rule governing the calculation of any
period by commencing the period on receipt regardless of the
medium used to communicate the offer provides ease of
application and avoids confusion. Although a fact-sensitive
determination, given the possibility of enormous geographical
distance that might exist between the parties and the corresponding
period for non-electronic communications to travel that distance
for mail or telegram delivery systems, the CISG protects the
offeror from the risk of inordinate offer periods through the
application of its rule. Given the burgeoning use of electronic
communications and the availability of express mail, the receipt
rule is likely to be applicable more often than not.
V. Acceptance
Unless the offeror unambiguously directs otherwise, UCC
Section 2-206 .provides that acceptance may be made in any
reasonable manner, promise or performance, and communicated
by any reasonable medium -- letter, fax, smoke signal, or email. 39
Supplemented by the common law rules regarding acceptance,
acceptance for contracts for the sale of goods is effective upon
dispatch.140
Despite the contrary position of the Second
Restatement on the Law of Contracts that acceptance by
instantaneous communication should be treated as though the
parties are in each other's presence and thereby subject to a receipt
rule,141 prevailing authority holds that the dispatch rule,
139 U.C.C. § 2-206 (1977) ("Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract. (1)
Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an offer
to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable in the circumstances; (b) an order or other offer to buy goods for
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt
promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-conforming
goods, but such a shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an acceptance if
the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an
accommodation to the buyer. (2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a
reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a
reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.").
140 Id. § 1-103(b).
141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 64 ("Acceptance given by telephone
or other medium of substantially instantaneous two-way communication is governed by
the principles applicable to acceptances where the parties are in the presence of each
other.").
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historically implemented for responses by mail, is applicable for
communication by telephone and telex.142 This application should
be extended to email, fax, video conferencing, and text messaging
rather than the "when heard" or "received" rule that governs
parties dealing in each other's presence in order to simplify the
law and minimize confusion. 4 3
Rather than a dis atch rule for acceptance, the CISG requires
receipt by the offeror 4 before the expiration of the time fixed for
an acceptance to be effective.1 45 Although an offer becomes
irrevocable once the offeree has dispatched its acceptance, actual
receipt of the acceptance is required for contract formation.146
Unless the circumstances otherwise indicate a different result,
acceptance of an oral offer is required immediately.147 Currently,
no case authority addresses this rule or the substantially similar
rule of the UNIDROIT Principles for International Contracts.148
See Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 139 A.2d 638 (Penn. 1958); see also
United States v. Bushwick Mills, 165 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1947); Rothenberg v. H.
Rothstein & Sons, 181 F.2d 345 (3d. Cir. 1950); Toll v. Tannenbaum, 982 F. Supp. 2d
541 (E.D. Penn. 2013); Cardon v. Hampton, 109 So. 176 (Ala. Ct. App. 1926); Bank of
Yolo v. Sperry Flour Co., 74 P. 855 (Cal. 1903); Bundsen v. Worker's Comp. App. Bd.,
195 Cal. Rptr. 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Pearson v. Electric Service Co., 201 P.2d 643
(Kan. 1949); Graham v. TSL, Ltd., 350 S.W.3d 430 (Ky. 2011); Traugott v. Virginia
Transp., 341 S.W.3d 115 (Ky. 2011); Dudley A. Tyng & Co. v. Converse, 146 N.W. 629
(Mich. 1914); Kay v. Kay, 957 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Harshberger v.
Reliable-Aire, Inc., 619 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Traders Oil Mill Co. v.
Arnold Bros. Gin Co., 225 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex Civ. App. 1949).
143 But see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 177 § 3.22 (3rd
ed. 1999).
144 CISG, supra note 15, art. 18(2) ("An acceptance of an offer becomes effective at
the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror. An acceptance is not effective if
the indication of assent does not reach the offeror within the time he has fixed or, if no
time is fixed, within a reasonable time, due account being taken of the circumstances of
the transaction, including the rapidity of the means of communication employed by the
offeror. An oral offer must be accepted immediately unless the circumstances indicate
otherwise.").
145 Case No. 7844/1994, (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. 1994).
146 CISG, supra note 15, art. 23 ("A contract is concluded at the moment when an
acceptance of an offer becomes effective in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention.").
147 Id. art. 18(2) ("An oral offer must be accepted immediately unless the
circumstances indicate otherwise").
148 Int'l Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts art. 2.1.7 (Time of Acceptance) (2010) ("An offer
142
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An oral offer should include not only conversations when the
parties are in each other's presence, but also communications by
telephone and video conferencing.
As a result of the CISG's receipt rule, rather than a dispatch
rule, the risk of delay or non-receipt is placed on the offeree rather
than the offeror. Common law tradition allocates the risk to the
offeror who, as master of the offer, could have required receipt of
the acceptance before contract formation and has not done so. In
so allocating the risk to the offeror, the contract was formed at the
point of the objective manifestation by the offeree, binding both
parties and nullifying the offeror's power to revoke between the
time of the offeree's manifestation and the offeror's receipt. This
common law approach protects the offeree's possible change of
position in reliance on the anticipated contract.149 The CISG
addresses these risks by prohibiting the offeror's revocation of the
offer after the acceptance is dispatched,150 while placing the risk of
delay in transmission on the party best able to avoid or minimize
the delay, the offeree. However, the risk of aberrant or abnormal
delay is minimized if the actual transmission bears evidence that if
normal transmission had occurred, the acceptance would have
been received in a timely fashion. Article 21 of the CISG makes
such abnormally late acceptances effective unless the offeror gives
prompt oral notice or promptly dispatches notice that the offer
lapsed.' 5 1
Unlike the dispatch rule of the common law, the receipt rule
creates an opportunity for the offeree to withdraw its acceptance if
the withdrawal reaches the offeror before or at the same time as
must be accepted within the time the offeror has fixed or, if no time is fixed, within a
reasonable time having regard to the circumstances, including the rapidity of the means
of communication employed by the offeror. An oral offer must be accepted immediately
unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.").
149 JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITEDNATIONS CONVENTION 160-162 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 3d ed.
2009).
150See CISG, supra note 15, art. 16 (discussing the effect of the dispatch of the
acceptance).
'5' Id. art. 21(2) ("Ifa letter or other writing containing a late acceptance shows that
it has been sent in such circumstances that if its transmission had been normal it would
have reached the offeror in due time, the late acceptance is effective as an acceptance
unless, without delay, the offeror orally informs the offeree that he considers his offer as
having lapsed or dispatches a notice to that effect.").
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the acceptance.152 An overtaking withdrawal of acceptance is
effective. Such action by an offeree, subject to the domestic
dispatch rule, is an impermissible attempted revocation of
acceptance. 5 3 It may be treated as a repudiation of the contract
formed upon dispatch of the acceptance or, if the offeror chooses,
may be treated as an offer to rescind the contract.154
Both approaches to designating the effective point for the act
constituting acceptance address problems inherent in any
approach. The CISG's use of one approach for all modes of
transacting results in certainty and predictability for offerees and
their attorneys and also minimizes confusion. Both approaches
empower the offeror to conclude a contract by either treating the
late acceptance as effective if followed by prompt notice,15 5 or by
treating the late acceptance as a counteroffer available for the
offeror's acceptance.
The offeror's inaction after receipt of a
late acceptance gives effect to the terms of the offer, avoids the
extension of a contractual obligation liability when the offeree
fails to act with greater promptness, and maintains the offeror's
position of master of its offers. Both approaches recognize that a
rejection of an offer is effective upon receipt. Both authorize
irrevocable offers, but only the CISG empowers the offeree to
reject an irrevocable offer before the period of irrevocability has
expired in the absence of reliance on the rejection by the offeror.15 7
At common law, once an option contract was created, conduct by
152 Id. art. 22 ("An acceptance may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches the
offeror before or at the same time as the acceptance would have become effective.").
153 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. a (1981).
154 Id. cmt. c.
155 CISG, supra note 15, art. 21(1) ("A late acceptance is nevertheless effective as
an acceptance if without delay the offeror orally so informs the offeree or dispatches a
notice to that effect").
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 70 ("Effect of Receipt by Offeror of a
Late or Otherwise Defective Acceptance: A late or otherwise defective acceptance may
be effective as an offer to the original offeror, but his silence operates as an acceptance in
such a case only as stated in § 69.").
157 CISG, supra note 15, art. 17 ("An offer, even if it is irrevocable, is terminated
when a rejection reaches the offeror."); cf RESTATEMENT § 37 ("Termination of Power of
Acceptance Under Option Contract. Notwithstanding §§ 38-49, the power of acceptance
under an option contract is not terminated by rejection or counter-offer, by revocation, or
by death or incapacity of the offeror, unless the requirements are met for the discharge of
a contractual duty.").
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an offeree constituting a rejection of the offer does not terminate
the option absent reliance on the rejection by the offeror.'s
A. Battle of the Forms - DistinguishableTheoretical
Approaches
1. Battle of the forms -- The UCC

No change of the common law rules by the UCC has generated
as much discussion and angst as the promulgation and codification
of UCC Section 2-207, the "Battle of the Forms."l 59 Abrogating
both the mirror image rule and the last shot rule, UCC Section 2207 authorizes the formation of a contract if the acceptance assents
to the bargained-for or dickered-for material terms of price,
quantity, subject matter, and delivery but introduces additional
and/or different terms to the proposed exchange.o With these
new proposals, the acceptance does not mirror the offer but it is
not treated as a counteroffer unless the communication expresses
an unwillingness to go forward with the transaction in the absence
of assent to the additional or different terms.1 6 1 If this condition is
not included in the offeree's purported acceptance, a contract is
created based on the offeree's assent to the bargained-for terms
and the boilerplate on the reverse side, if any, on the offeror's
form. 162 When the parties are merchants, professional rather than
158

RESTATEMENT

159 U.C.C.

§ 37, supra note

157.

§ 2-207 (1977) ("Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation. (1) A

definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional
to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. (2) The additional terms are to
be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms
of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has
already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish
a contract. In such case, the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.").
i6o Id. § 2-207(1).
161

Id.

162 See, e.g., Energy Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Homer Laughlin China Co., 186 F.R.D.
369, 374 (S.D. Ohio 1999), affd, 229 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that when a
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casual buyers and sellers with knowledge of general business
practices, 3 Section 2-207(2) is applied to determine the impact, if
any, of the offeree's terms on the contract created by the offeree's
assent.1 64
Assume, however, that the offeree's purported acceptance
includes an explicit condition that the acceptance is conditioned on
"assent" to the additional or different terms. This purported
acceptance constitutes a counteroffer and this counteroffer,
according to the prevailing approach, may only be accepted by the
offeror expressly assenting to the offeree's additional terms - the
the manner of assent required by the express condition.165 Despite
the creation of a counteroffer with the required conditional
language and the failure of the other party to provide the required
express assent to the additional or different terms, if the parties
proceed with their transaction and both parties engage in conduct
that manifests an intent to contract, such as the seller's shipment of
the goods and the buyer's payment for the goods, a contract is
formed.166 Section 2-207(c) governs the determination of the
terms. The terms of this contract are: (1) the terms upon which
the writings previously exchanged by the parties agree and (2)
supplementary terms from the UCC gap-fillers.' 67 Formerly, the
common law, via the last shot rule, made the counteroffer the
operative document for determining the terms of the agreement.

transaction is between merchants, a differing form operates as an acceptance of the
contract and the additional terms become part of the contract unless: (1) the offer
expressly limits acceptance to the original terms; (2) the additional terms materially alter
the contract; or (3) notification of objection to the additional terms has already been
given or within a reasonable time after notice of them is received).
163 U.C.C. § 2-104(l), § 2-104(3), cmts. 1-2.
164 See id. § 2-207(2).
165 See

PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, L.P., f/k/a Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. The
Christy Refractories, L.L.C., 225 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2000); Commerce &
Industry Insurance Company v. Bayer Corp., 433 Mass. 388, 742 N.E.2d 567,
44 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 50 (2001); see also Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack
Corporation, 794 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (the buyer objected to
additional terms stated in the seller's acceptance expressly conditioned upon
assent to those terms thereafter with knowledge of the terms accepted goods
shipped by the seller: UCC 2-207(3) governed the agreement between the
parties).
166 U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 7.
167 Id. § 2-207(3).
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Section 2-207 renders the last shot rule ineffective; it is thereby
abrogated.168 The party who transmits the last form no longer
controls the terms of the agreement if the communication assents
to the dickered for terms unless the offeree insists on assent to its
additional terms and obtains that assent. Otherwise, the effect of
additional terms in an acceptance is determined by either
subsection 2-207 (2) or 2-207(3). In the latter case, the intent to be
bound is based on the conduct following the exchange of forms
and is sufficient to create the contract. The exchanged forms
provide some of the terms upon which the parties were willing to
contract and provide a reasonably certain basis for a remedy.
These terms and applicable default rules of Article 2 are the terms
of the contract. 169 The operation of Section 2-207 demonstrates
the substantive preference for contract formation by both the
drafters who promulgated the section and legislatures who codified
it. A contract is always formed if assent is given to the bargainedfor terms under subsection 2-207(1) or if conduct by both parties
under subsection 2-207(3) indicates assent to the bargained-for
terms. This preference or policy goal is consistent with other
policy goals reflected in the UCC such as "keep the deal
together."17 0
Several contemporary scholars assert that Section 2-207(3) is
also applicable if the offeree's response to an offer is in fact a
common law counteroffer, 7' not a purported acceptance, and the
parties proceed to perform.172 Here, they argue the agreement, as
168See generally, Dorton and J. A. Castle, Partners, d/b/a The Carpet Mart v. Collins
& Aikman Corporation and Painter Carpet Mills, Inc., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir.
1972); I Hawkland UCC Series § 2-207:1 (common law rules for contract formation
often lead [sic] to the formation of a contract on the terms in the last communication, and
came to be known as the "last shot" rule).

169 U.C.C. § 2-207.
170See, e.g., id. §§ 2-609-610(b), § 1-308(a).
171See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39,

infra note 170, for a definition

of counteroffer.
172 LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, SALES AND LEASES, A PROBLEMSOLVING APPROACH 43 (2009) (displaying a chart of UCC 2-207 which treats all
ineffective responses to offers as falling within UCC § 2-207(3)); see also WHITE &
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-3 46 (6th ed. 2010) (suggesting that
subsection (3) works better if the seller-offeree responds to buyer-offeror with a reject
and thereafter ships the goods and the buyer accepts rather than for conduct following

expressly conditional acceptances). But see I HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-207:1
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determined by section 2-207(3), includes the terms upon which the
parties agree and the supplementary gap-fillers. A counteroffer, a
seasonable response that varies a dickered-for or bargained-for
term of the offer, does not satisfy the condition precedent for the
application of Section 2-207(1); it is not a definite and seasonable
expression of assent.1 73 Effect must be given to the intent of the
offeree who is rejecting the offer and proposing an entirely
different agreement by recognizing that a contract is being created
on the offeree's terms. Moreover, an offeree's counteroffer is
distinguishable from a communication that is a conditional
acceptance, one that assents to the dickered or bargained for terms
and demands assent to additional terms or non-dickered for
different terms.174 The offeree who assents to the bargained-for
terms, insisting on assent to its non-dickered for terms, should be
allocated the risk of contract formation on the dickered-for terms
assented to if he/she failed to wait for the assent he/she insisted
upon and proceeds with performance without receiving the assent
he/she required.175 A communication that does not assent to the
("Section 2-207 was designed to address this situation [the operation of the last shot rule
when parties did not review the contents of the other's form beyond the dickered-for
terms] by providing a mechanism for finding contract formation when tile acceptance
contained different or additional terns from the terms in the offer, and for determining
the terms of a contract formed through an offer and acceptance in this manner.")
(emphasis added).
173 U.C.C. § 2-207(1); see also id. § 1-107 ("Section captions are part of the
Uniform Commercial Code."). The caption for UCC § 2-207 reads as follows:" § 2-207.
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation." Id. at § 2-207. By its terms, UCC §
2-207 is inapplicable to counteroffers. Section 2-207(3) isn't needed to determine the
terms of the contract if the counteroffer is accepted by conduct.
174 See generally, Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp, 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir.
1972) (explaining the operation of U.C.C. § 2-207 and stating "no contract is recognized
under Subsection 2-207(1)-either because no definite expression of acceptance exists or,
more specifically, because the offeree's acceptance is expressly conditioned on the
offeror's assent to the additional or different terms-the entire transaction aborts at this
point"); C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977)
("[W]hile a seller may take advantage of an "expressly conditional" clause ... when he
elects not to perform, he must accept the potential risk under Subsection (3) of not
getting his additional terms when he elects to proceed with performance without first
obtaining the buyer's assent to those terms. Since the seller injected ambiguity into the
transaction by inserting the "expressly conditional" clause in his form, he, and not the
buyer, should bear the consequence of that ambiguity under Subsection (3).").
175 C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977)
(stating that an offeree who creates an ambiguity by insisting on assent but then performs
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bargained-for terms is not a "purported acceptance" and should
not trigger the application of Section 2-207. In this instance,
Section 2-204 rather than Section 2-207 should govern the
agreement between the parties.176 Neither the legislative history
nor the commentary suggests that the drafters intended to negate
the viability of counteroffers with the promulgation and
codification of Section 2-207.177 Some might argue that the
introductory language of comment 7 to 2-207 supports the position
espoused by contemporary scholars who apply subsection 2207(3) to counteroffers. This language states:
In many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and
paid for before any dispute arises, there is no question
whether a contract has been made. In such cases, where
the writings of the parties do not establish a contract, it is
not necessary to determine which act or document
constituted the offer and which the acceptance.
See
Section 2-204. The only question is what terms are
included in the contract, and subsection (3) furnishes the
governing rule. 7 8
This commentary addresses fully executed contracts and
directs that for these fully executed contracts, Section 2-207(3) is
the operative rule when the writings of the parties do not establish
a contract. It is, however, commentary to Section 2-207 that
abrogates the mirror image rule of general contract law in two
envisioned contexts: confirmation(s) of prior agreement and offer
and acceptance when the acceptance "adds further minor
suggestions or proposals"l179 as additional or different terms.
Neither the Section nor the comments are directed towards the
abrogation of counteroffers as a juridical tool in the context of
goods.'o
without receiving it should bear the risk of contract formation under subsection (3)
without obtaining its additional terms).
176 U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
177 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission for 1954, Hearings on the
Uniform Commercial Code, vol. 1 (1954); see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(b)(offer of an
accommodation).
178 U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 7 (emphasis added).
179See id. cmt. 1.
180 See Gregory M. Travalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling
Fairnessand Efficiency in a FormalApproach to UC. C. Section 2-207, 33 Case W. Res.
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Some commentators likewise assert that Section 2-207(3)
should govern if the offeree's response is a nonacceptance such as
"I reject your offer" but follows by shipping the goods.'
Applying Section 2-207(3) is problematic here as well. Offeree's
rejection terminates the power of acceptance created by the
offeror's offer.18 2
Termination of the power of acceptance
minimizes the risk of potential reliance by the offeror in preparing
to perform or by creating a duplicative power of acceptance in
another party.8 3 Likewise, the offeree is protected; his subsequent
conduct cannot be interpreted as an acceptance.' 84 The subsequent
formation of a contract by the shipment of goods and acceptance
by the offeror fits precisely within the parameters of Section 2204, as Section 2-207(c) recognizes. Applying the process
dictated by Section 2-207(c) results in a meaningless step:
comparing the writings of the parties, the offer and the rejection to
determine terms upon which the writings agree. No agreement in
terms exists with these writings; the parties have only
demonstrated an intent to contract by their conduct and the shipped
goods provide a reasonably certain basis for a remedy.'
The
supplementary terms of Article 2 will be used to fill the gaps.
Invoking the unwelcomed presence of Section 2-207 is
unnecessary. But observe, the erroneous application of Section 2207, here, does not result in the deprivation that the counterofferor
experiences if Section 2-207(c) is applied in the counteroffer
setting.

L. Rev. 327, 337-338 (1982-1983) (relying on the operation of UCC § 2-206 to illustrate
that the drafters did not intend to abrogate counteroffers).
1I WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-3 46 (6th ed. 2010); John
E. Murray, The Choas of the Battle Of the Forms: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307,
1332 (1986).
182 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§

38(1)

An offeree's power of

acceptance is terminated by his rejection of the offer, unless the offeror has manifested a
contrary intention. (2) A manifestation of intention not to accept an offer is a rejection
unless the offeree manifests an intention to
take it under further advisement.
183 Id. cmt. a.
184 Id.

185 U.C.C.

§ 2-204(3).
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2. Battle of the Forms - The CISG

The theoretical construct of the provision of the CISG that
governs a battle of the forms is diametrically opposed to that of the
UCC. Discussion and debate on March 18, 1980, during the 1980
Vienna Diplomatic Conference on former Article 17,186 now
Article 19, establishes that the framework of Article 19 was
designed to achieve a balance between two competing goals: (1)
certainty and security in contract formation' 8 7 and, (2) recognition
of prevailing trade practice that although minor changes are made
to the offer, the parties believe that a contract has been formed and
perform it.188 The governing principle of the approach adopted by

186 1978 Draft of Article 17 which became current Article 19: (1) A reply to an offer
which purports to be an acceptance containing additions, limitations or other
modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer. (2) However, a
reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but which contains additional or
different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an
acceptance unless the offeror objects to the discrepancy without undue delay. If he does
not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications
contained in the acceptance. (3) Additional or different terms relating, inter alia, to the
price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of
one party's liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to alter the
terms of the offer materially, unless the offeree by virtue of the offer or the particular
circumstances of the case has reason to believe they are acceptable to the offeror. The
Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1978), 27 AM. J.
COMP. L. 325, 328-29 (1989).
1871980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary of First Meeting Proceedings,
March 18, 1980 ("25. Mr. STALEV (Bulgaria), introducing his delegation's amendment
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.91), explained that article 16(1) [became CISG article 18(l) ] and
article 17(1) [became CISG article 19(1) ] established a fundamental rule and a rational
principle, i.e., that there could be no contract without agreement by the parties on all
points. However, that fundamental rule was almost nullified by the exceptions given in
paragraphs 2 and 3: paragraph 2 gave an exception to paragraph 1, the first sentence of
paragraph 3 an exception to paragraph 2, and the second sentence of paragraph 3 an
exception to the first sentence, the result being that a contract could be concluded
implicity [sic] when there had been no agreement on the essential elements of sale as
stated in the first sentence of paragraph 3. That solution sacrificed the fundamental
considerations of international trade relations -- certainty and security -- to less important
considerations, such as the flexibility of rules and equity in individual cases. It also
jeopardized the interests of less experienced enterprises, which might not refuse an offer
in good time. 26. His delegation therefore proposed that paragraphs 2 and 3 should be
deleted and, if that proposal were not accepted, recommended that at least the last part of

paragraph 3 from 'unless the offeree . . . ' should be deleted.").

188 Id. ("28. Mr. SEV)N (Finland) said that he could not agree to either of the
proposals, since trade nowadays largely took place in the manner described in paragraphs
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the CISG is based on the general theory reflecting the "mirror
image" rule. A reply to an offer that is a "purported" acceptance
but contains additional or different terms is a rejection and a
counteroffer.189 This principle is consistent with the general rule
of domestic common law. The CISG does, however, modify the
strict common law approach to counteroffers. Generally, at
common law, counteroffers terminate an offer and, unless the
counteroffer is accepted, no contract results.1 90 The CISG
recognizes one exception to this general rule: if the additional or
different terms in the purported acceptance are immaterialand the
offeror does not object without delay, a contract is formed based
on the offer as modified or supplemented by the immaterial
additional or different terms of the acceptance.'91
The

2 and 3. 29. Mr. MASKOW (German Democratic Republic) regretted that he could not
support the United Kingdom and Bulgarian proposals since experience had shown that in
trade practice minor changes were often made to the offer and that contracts were
nevertheless considered as having been concluded and were performed. The only effect
that the deletion of the paragraphs would have would be to make some contracts void
which would nonetheless be executed, and that would cause serious difficulties. It would
therefore be preferable to keep the existing text, even if it was not perfect. In any event,
the problems which those provisions might give rise to were less serious than those
which might arise if the provisions were deleted."). See Alejandro M. Garro,
Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
InternationalSale of Goods, 23 INT'L LAw 443, 462 (1989) (discussing the Article 19
compromise between "the strict socialist view that an acceptance that deviates from the
offer amounts to a rejection, and the more flexible view of Western countries that
considers the contract as concluded if the acceptance contains minor additions or
limitations").
189 CISG, supra note 15, art. 19(1) ("A reply to an offer which purports to be an
acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications, is a rejection of the
offer and constitutes a counteroffer.").
190RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39:(1) ("(1) A counter-offer is an offer
made by an offeree to his offeror relating to the same matter as the original offer and
proposing a substituted bargain differing from that proposed by the original offer. (2) An
offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by his making of a counter-offer, unless the
offeror has manifested a contrary intention or unless the counter-offer manifests a
contrary intention of the offeree."). See also id. § 36(l)(a)-(2) ("(1) An offeree's power
of acceptance may be terminated by (a) rejection or counter-offer by the offeree . . .. (2)
In addition, an offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by the non-occurrence of any
condition of acceptance under the terms of the offer.").
191 CISG, supra note 15, art. 19(2) ("However, a reply to an offer which purports to
be an acceptance but contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter
the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay,
objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not so
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communication is an acceptance.192 Debate and discussion at the
Diplomatic Conference centered on two points: (1) the retention
of this exception to the general rule, that responses with additional
or different terms were counteroffers and (2) the inclusion of
another exception that treated as immaterial terms, those additional
or different terms arising from the offeree's understanding of the
offer and those additional or different terms that reflected the
practices between the parties; without exception (2) above, these
terms would be treated as material ones. The text of the proposed
text read:
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an
acceptance but which contains additional or different terms
which do not materially alter the terms of the offer
constitutes an acceptance unless the offeror objects to the
discrepancy without undue delay. If he does not so object,
the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the
modifications contained in the acceptance. (3) Additional
or different terms relating, inter alia, to the price, payment,
quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of
delivery, extent of one party's liability to the other or the
settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of
the offer materially, unless the offeree by virtue of the offer
or the particularcircumstances of the case has reason to
believe they are acceptable to the offeror.
The Conference rejected this proposal and adopted a second
alternative proposed by the Bulgarian delegate,1 93 eliminating the
second phrase of subsection (3) that expanded the definition of
"immaterial" to include exceptions implied from circumstances.
The resulting provision distinguishes immaterial terms from
material ones. Unlike the UCC, the CISG identifies the following
categories as material in its non-exhaustive list: "terms relating,
among other things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of
the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party's
liability to the other or the settlement of disputes."' 94 Thus, the

object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications
contained in the acceptance.").
192 Id. art. 19(2).
193 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, supra note 187, 26.
194 CISG, supra note 15, art. 19(3).
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last shot rule continues to operate, to a limited extent, under the
CISG.' 95 This fact is illustrated by the following hypothetical
setting:
A French buyer reviewed the catalogue of an Illinois seller,
from whom the buyer had purchased equipment over a
five-year period, identified a freezer/cooler unit in the
catalogue with a list price of $7,500 and called the seller's
sales department. The representative discussed the buyer's
need and agreed that the selected unit was an appropriate
selection. The parties discussed payments. The buyer then
ordered ten units for its numerous restaurants for
immediate shipping. The buyer was informed that once its
credit and payment history were verified the seller would
respond with its acknowledgment form. Thereafter, seller
sent and the buyer received the seller's acknowledgment
form correctly stating the price and the items ordered by
the buyer, that the equipment had been shipped, the
anticipated delivery date, and a statement that the terms
and conditions on the reverse side were terms of the
agreement. These terms provided that: disputes were to be
resolved by binding arbitration, the buyer must provide
notice of any problem within twenty (20) days of receipt in
order to qualify for a remedy, and that the laws of Illinois
applied. The buyer did not respond.
The buyer's order was a proposal that constituted an offer;' 96
the price and quantity were fixed at the time the order was
placed. 197 The sharing of its credit information, the placing of its
order, and the request for immediate shipment were evidence of
the buyer's intent to be bound.198 Article 14 directs that this
195 See generally, DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE 70 n. 124 (Cambridge University Press 2005).

196CISG, supra note 15, art. 14(1) ("A proposal for concluding a contract addressed
to one or more specific persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and
indicates the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A proposal is
sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes
provision for determining the quantity and the price. (2) A proposal other than one
addressed to one or more specific persons is to be considered merely an invitation to
make offers, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the person making the
proposal.").
197 Id.
198

Id.
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communication is an offer.199 The seller's acknowledgment is a
purported acceptance because it assents to the terms of price,
quantity, and subject matter. However, it is also a rejection and a
counteroffer. It does not operate as an acceptance. Material terms
were included in the purported acceptance. These include the
settlement of disputes by arbitration, the imposition of the duty to
provide notice of quality problems within twenty (20) days as a
condition precedent to remedial relief, and the designation of an
applicable law.2o The goods have been shipped. Assume that
upon delivery to the buyer, the buyer takes possession of the
goods. That conduct, absent circumstances indicating a contrary
intent, such as notice that the goods are being held for the seller,
should constitute acceptance of the seller's counteroffer.2 02 The
seller's counteroffer with the material additions will govern their
transaction. Unlike the policy goal of the UCC to forge a
contractual relationship upon assent to the bargained-for terms,
the CISG treats material modifications to the offer as a
counteroffer. Only with assent to the counteroffer is a contract
formed.
Some might argue that the above analysis under the CISG is
indistinguishable from the outcome if UCC 2-207(1) and (2) were
applied to the facts. This is an erroneous conclusion produced by
the similarity of the language of the two laws. If the UCC was
applied to the above hypothetical situation, the sending of the
purported acceptance with additional terms results in a contract
without addressing the materiality of the terms suggested by the
offeree.
The parties have a contract and obligations of
The parties in the hypothetical setting are
performance.

199

Id.

200 CISG, supra note 15, art. 19(3).
201 Id. art. 8(l)-(2).

202Id. art. 18(1) ("A statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating
assent to an offer is an acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to
acceptance.") See also CISG, supra note 15, art. 18(3) ("However, if, by virtue of the
offer or as a result of practices which the parties have established between themselves or
of usage, the offeree may indicate assent by performing an act, such as one relating to the
dispatch of the goods or payment of the price, without notice to the offeror, the
acceptance is effective at the moment the act is performed, provided that the act is
performed within the period of time laid down in the preceding paragraph.").

N.C. J.INT'L L. &COM. REG.

288

Vol. XL

merchants, professionals. 20 3 Therefore, Section 2-207(2) requires
an assessment of whether the additional terms are terms of the
contract. Subsequent to contract formation, two questions must be
addressed: "Did the offeror limit acceptance to the terms of the
offer"; if not, "Are the terms materially altering and not part of the
contract or are the terms immaterial and, therefore, part of the
contract?" This is a subtle but significant difference. For
example, assume in the foregoing hypothetical that the offeror
objects to the additional terms under 2-207(2)(c) after receiving
the purported acceptance; this objection prevents a term
determined to be an immaterial term from becoming a term of the
already existing contract but does not limit contract formation.
However, the application of the CISG produces.a different result:
the purported acceptance including additional or different material
terms, as defined by the law, is a counteroffer- and buyer's
acceptance of the shipped goods will operate as an acceptance.204
If the term are immaterial ones, the buyer-offeror must objects
orally or by dispatching a notice of objection-ne to prevent
formation of a contract that includes the offeree's immaterial
terms.
Whether the governing law is the CISG or the UCC,
commercial parties are likely to believe that a contract exists after
the exchange in forms, and one or both of them may perform.
Only if a dispute arises will the question of formation arise.
Rather than generating costly litigation or arbitration under the
UCC on whether a contract exists or whether the additionals terms
are material or immaterial and, therefore, terms of the contract,
resolution of the dispute is facilitated under CISG Article 19. The
seller's communication was a counteroffer that was later accepted;
the offeree's terms govern even if those terms are material because
the counteroffer is the governing document.20 5 The cost of
international litigation or arbitration, the difficulties in
communications because of language differences, and likelihood
of great physical distance between the parties support a policy goal
that results in greater clarity of the governing terms rather than
fostering contract formation with a later resolution of the
203

U.C.C. § 2-104.

204

CISG, supra note 15, art. 19(2).
Id. art. 19(1).

205
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governing terms. From its entry into force in 1988, only 129 cases
are indexed for raising an Article 19 issue. The "Uniform
Commercial Code 2-207 makes a major change in the traditional
approach, which has reduced the possibility of reneging in the first
type of situation [change in circumstances before performance], at
the cost of increasing the likelihood of disputes in the second type
of situation [change in circumstances after performance such as
delivery of the goods]." 20 6
Despite the benefits afforded by the approach to the battle of
the forms in the CISG, some courts reject the application of the
Interpreting
limited last shot rule that the CISG imposes.
Article 19 with the goal of modernizing the CISG results in a
deviation from the provisions of a promulgation that was not an
attempt to replicate any existing domestic legal regime, but rather
to create an autonomous one by harmonizing disparate approaches
to legal problems and to increase the predictability of the risks
untaken. Interpreting the CISG consistent with the goals of the
UCC or German domestic law to abrogate the mirror image rule
and the last shot rule depart from a court's duty to interpret the
CISG as directed by Article 7: (1) consistent with its international
character rather than permitting the analysis to be driven by local
law and policy; (2) to promote uniformity in its application - thus,
mandating review of opinions of courts and arbitral awards
emanating from other contracting states; and (3) to encourage the

206 E. Allan Farnsworth, Formation of Contract, in INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS

3-15 § 3.04 (Matthew Bender 1984), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu
/cisg/biblio/farnsworth I.html) (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
207 See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Mar. 20, 1997, docket
no 2 Ob 58/97m, Clout no. 189 (Austria) (stating that a buyer's change in its acceptance
enlarging quantity is a nonmaterial change if it benefits the seller); Amtsgericht [AG]
Kehl 3 C 925/93 (Ger.) (available at
[Petty District Court] Oct. 6, 1995,
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/951006gl.html> (Gerd A. Zimmermann trans. , Ruth
M. Janal ed.) (assuming seller sent its general conditions parties waived the differences
and a contract was formed); Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich International Corp., 789 F.Supp.
1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcases/920414ul.html);
see Larry A. DiMatteo, et. al., The Interpretive Turn In International Sales Law: An
Analysis ofFifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence,24 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 299, 352-55
(2004) (reviewing the various approaches employed by courts to avoid the effect of
Article 19).
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observance of good faith in international trade.208
Most
importantly, the court's interpretation will defeat the expectations
of the nations who are contracting states to the CISG.
Unlike UCC Section 2-207 that has spawned substantial
litigation for determining the operation of the Section and resulting
terms of a contract, retention of a modified mirror image rule and
the last shot rule in Article 19 minimizes costly cross-border
litigation and fosters resolution of disputes because of the
operation of the last shot rule. The last shot rule, although
conservative, provides predictable results. 20 9
VI. Conclusion
The principles of contract formation of the CISG and the UCC,
supplemented by the common law, vary substantially. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that an attorney must be
competent in her representation of her clients.210 Attorneys are
obligated to ascertain the differences between the two regimes and
to determine the impact of the competing approaches on the
client's business objectives and contract goals before encouraging
the client to opt out of the CISG when it is applicable. 2 1' Given
the impact of geographical distances, language differences, and the
cost of dispute resolution in cross border transactions, the
conservative "last shot rule" of the CISG provides greater certainty
for determining the terms of the contract than UCC § 2-207. In
contrast, the risk of an allegation of a contrary "actual intent,"
coupled with the speed and frequency of electronic transacting in a
global community inundated with information, opting out of
Article 8(1) and adopting Article 8(2) as the governing standard
for interpreting both the intent of the parties and the meaning of
CISG, supra note 15, art. 7.
209 E. Allan Farnsworth, supra note 206, 3-16 § 3.04.
210 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 (1983) ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."). For a list of states that adopted the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, see http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/public
ations/modelrules-of professional conduct/chrono list state adopting modelrules.ht
mi.
211 See CISG, supra note 15, art. 6 (permitting the parties to derogate from any or all
of the provisions).
208
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terms is a reasonable recommendation to contracting parties. This
type of analysis should be undertaken by counsel when addressing
contracts for the international sale of goods in fulfilling their
ethical obligation to serve as a competent advisor.

